

Cours donné à Notre Dame en 1963
en anglais

258

- Notes de cours
- Photocopies d'Albert le Grand

(I have copied only the
pages indicating which
texts were used, D.P.)

And so it has been stated in a general way what soul is. For it is substance in the sense of logos (ratio, form). And this is the being of this sort of body (the reason this sort of body is alive), somewhat as if a tool such as an axe were a natural body, what would make it an axe would be its substance (in the sense of its form), and so its soul. ~~xxxxxx~~ If the shape of the material were removed from (the axe), the axe would no longer be an axe, except in an equivocal sense. The axe is in fact just an axe (and not a natural body). For it is not of this kind of body (namely, an artificial one) that the soul is the being (i.e., that because of what) or form, but of a natural body that has in itself a principle of motion and ~~xx~~/rest. What has been said must be made plain by means of the parts (of a living thing). If an eye were (all by itself) an animal, its soul would likewise be its sight, for sight is the substance of the eye (substance here meaning that which makes an eye ~~xxxxxx~~ an eye), which tells us what it is to ^{be} an eye. For, the eye is the material of sight, ~~xxxxxxfailingxxxx~~ and when sight fails, the eye is no longer an eye, except equivocally, as in the case of a stone or painted eye. And so we must see what is true of the part in the whole living body. For what part is in proportion to part, so is the sense as a whole to the whole sense-endowed body as such.

It is not that which lacks soul that is potentially capable of living, but only that which (already) has soul.

True, seeds or pods are potentially live bodies (i.e.,
are in potency with respect to the full-fledged body
that has soul). Waking life is an actuality ^{are} as/the
axe's cutting and the eye's seeing; ~~xxx~~ soul is an
actuality ^{are} as/the sense of sight and the power of the
axe; ~~xxx~~ and the body is that which is by way of potentiality.
Now, as ~~xxx~~ pupil and sight make ^{up} an eye, ~~xxx~~ body and
soul make ^{up} an animal.

μάθησις, ἡ, the act of learning; desire of learning,
instruction
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μάθημα, τό : that which is learnt, learning,
series, discipline.
especially the death series.

Et istum modum loquendi sequimur
communiter omnes, populi hoc quod natura
ad hoc nos inclinavit. Ea enim quae sunt
propria singulis in modo loquendi,
ordinem ~~pro~~ proferunt & propriis
conceptionibus universis, quae : sed id
quod observatur communiter apud omnes,
videtur & naturae inclinationem proferre.

de Colo 1, C. 2, n. 6

Notes on Anima

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Phil. language.

More than any other kind, phil. ~~language~~ talks & writing stands out in danger of winding up with a vocabulary that signifies, or has reference to, anything we really know. The words employed have all got frequently no more than the appearance of the words; they somehow signify, if anything, only themselves. Yet words more important in phil. than elsewhere. For word rec. etc. ^{ad aliam} ad seipsum.

Why? Order, memory.

A single word may acquire many meanings which have an order between them. Sometimes the order of meanings must be known, i.e. an earlier meaning must be understood if we are to grasp later meanings. Too frequently later meanings are taken as first: technical in pejorative sense.

E. p. dyslogism.

Four basic terms:

Up: Form-idea
Word out down
{ the word, pool
{ hinder
{ stuff of which a thing is made...

The Engl. 'word' has not received these later impositions, but 'matter' from matéria. See Whitehead, pt. of T., 56.

μ ο ρ φ η: form, shape, figure

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ὁ π ρ α γ μ α τ ο ς: tool for making smth.
organ of sense or apprehension

ψ ὤ χ η: breath (anima) exp. as signs of life.
life or spirit of man.
reason, understanding.

2. vague } km.
start } 3. concepts } form-idea
 } propria.

4. Place of the Anima in corpus naturale.

- I Phlogiston: subject: changeable being in comm.
- II hylionne: place: corpus
- III qm. of com.: quality → hypost. change. (Mater.)
- IV Living: (a) soul, in quodam abstraction.

Phil. & natural definitions

Other, basic texts on dialectics

Meta IV 1004 b 20 ff.; L. 4, 542.5-547

Post An. I, Lect. 1, lect. 20

De Trin. VI, a. 1

In Resp. III, L. 8, mit.

VI, L. 3, n. 7-74

Phil. { docens
utens

Definition { absolute { good { compl.
bad { incompl.
proposition (veritas) { true | likely
I P. An., L. 5, 526/9 { false | unlikely

Forma dicitur emend. potest:

(a) ut actus rei et pars ^{est} ipsius, et hoc modo non praedicatur de re. (e.g. anima).

(b) ut est intentio rei abstracta a re, et sic praedicatur, quia est intentio totius et non partis. Totum enim significatur.

Sed qualiter forma quae in ipso est, sive sit generis, sive diff., sive speciei, sive propria, sive accidentis; et secundum quod significatur totum etiam sunt alioquin illarum formarum, sive abstractivae ut apud (545) universales, et est illa de universali intentione totius sui: et ideo praedicatur de toto. Et hoc intentione totum conservat copiam

Why, do you think, the metaphysics
is brought into the argument?

a) Dilectio praedicatur de toto.

Simplex de composito vere non praedicatur.

Sed quae praedicatur in logico sunt
formae simplices.

b) Potentia et actus sunt principia compositorum

plurium, praecipuum principia substantiarum.

Sed logos sumit praedicata genera

(animal) et species (homo), unde

composita et non sunt intentiones solius

formae et speciei.

c) definitio composita, et concludit plura.

Similitudine philosophus considerat materiam

solam, quia materia non est principium

compositum. Et debet philosophus

inducere omnes causas.

Forma rei potest considerari et sic:

① ut actus rei et pars eius ejus: sic
non praedicatur.

② ut est intentio rei abstracta a re, et
sic praedicatur, quia est intentio
totius et non partis.

Totum enim significatur sub

qualibet forma quae in ipso

est, sive est pars, sive est differentia,

specie, proprium, accidentis.

Ut genus (totum) sub aliquo illius

formarum, sic abstractum a toto

ipso universale est istud universale

et intentio typus, et ideo praedicatur

de toto. Et tunc intentionis totus

consideratur logice. Quaedam sunt

formae simpliciter, quodam compositae.

There are three disciplines that are about common things.

- (a) First Phil. or metaph., which is about res communes, being, its parts and its properties.
- (b) logic, too, being about the common intentions, which are coextensive with reality, for reason stands to all. But logic not about the things themselves (ipsas res), but about the operation of reason concerning things, such as the syllogism, enumeration, predication, etc.

But logic has two parts:

(i) demorative, which is about the intention of reason themselves; here logic proceeds ascends;

(ii) proceeds toward things; in this, logic is used. The use of logic belongs to the other disciplines. ~~whereas~~ ^{to proceed} ~~proceeds~~ from common intentions to show something about the things themselves, is the business of dialectic.

This latter:

① circa communia rerum, e.g., "bated is in the concupiscible, for love is in the concupiscible, and they are contraries; contraries ~~as in the~~ are about the same subject." This is true, so long as we remain in generalities. When we deal with

② propria, then only probable. See Phys. VI, lect. 3, n. 9 (Pinella 1489-1490).
Item Phys. III, l. 8, nn. 1-4 (684-687)

[Compare with Hegel, esp. the Logic, circa contrad., which furnishes him with a rigid form and hence appears as a system and inference.]

The philosopher, the dialectician, the sophist all talk about all things. Even sophistry resembles philosophy as the semblance of play.

The differences:

Philosopher from dialectician by form: proceeds demonstratively. Dialectician ("circa omnia") proceeds from probable things, and leads to opinion.

As. ideas: quia ens est duplex:

- (a) rationalis: distinctus de illis intentionibus quas ratio adiuvant in rebus consideratis: ut intentiones generis, speciei et individui, quae non inveniuntur in rebus naturae, sed considerationem rationis accipiunt. Et est proprium subiectum logicae. Entibus, tamen naturae aequiparantur. (Reason as in Port. And.)
- (+) naturalis
- Dialectic proceeds from the things that ~~are~~ intentiones from the intentiones that are affinities to the things of nature. Hence called intentiones, "quia virtute proprium est ex principis intentionis procedere."

The sophist diff from both philosopher and dialectician by choice, "desiderio vitae": ut dialecticus seipsum ex omnibus reseruat.

Dialectic and sophistry nontheoretical sciences. It is their use that falls short of science. Dialectic } does when

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In Boeth. de Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1^m p.

A threeped rational process:

Ex parte principiorum
ex quibus proceditur

(1) Because of the principles from which one proceeds, as when we try to prove something starting from works of the reason, such as genus, species, opposition and other such (second) intentions which are considered by the logician. This is the case when in a science one uses propositions which are provided in logic, using logic as teaching (docens), using it in the other sciences. This occurs in logic and metaph., because both sciences somehow have the same subject, E.g., defⁿ of substance.

Ex terminis in quo
distitur procedendo

(2) ~~There are cases of reasoning where the mind reaches a term in which it rests by reason of the terms in which the mind comes to rest~~ namely in demonstration. But it happens that reason's investigation cannot reach that term, "sed distitur in ipsa inquisitione", that is when the way is still open to some alternative ~~direction~~ such is the case when we start from probable reasons, which ~~may~~ produce opinion, not science. This may occur in every science, when probable reasons prepare the way for necessary proofs. - This is another way of using logic in the ~~the~~ demonstr. sciences, not however inasmuch as logic is docens, but inasmuch as it is utens.

dist. via { ad princ.
ad concl.

A potest rationali

(3) A third process is called rational in still another way, namely, by reason of ^{the} rational power that is characteristic of the human mind, which is discursive; inasmuch as in proceeding from one term to another in knowing, we follow the mode that is proper to the human mind. The rational process, so understood, is proper to natural sciences.

(4)

Natural sc. follows the mode of the human mind in two ways:

- (a) Inasmuch as it proceeds from sensible things, more known to us, toward things that are in themselves intelligible (i.e. in act), more knowable in themselves. Natural sc. accordingly moves from the ~~first~~ ^{former} to the latter; and demonstrations by means of sign or effect is mostly used in natural science (*maxime usitata*).
- (b) Since it is proper to reason to go from one thing to another, this process is observed most of all in natural science, in which from knowledge of one thing we come to know ^{edge of} another, as when from knowledge of an effect we get to know the cause. And the procedure is not only from effect to ~~cause~~ ^{cause} one thing to another that differs only in notion, as when we proceed from animal to man, for here man and animal are the same thing; whereas in the Math. sc. one proceeds only by means of what belongs to what the subject is, seeing that they demonstrate by formal cause only; hence they do not demonstrate something of one thing by means of another, but rather by the proper definition of that one thing. For although some demonstrations are given about circle from triangle, or *e converso* this is only inasmuch as in a circle there potentially a triangle, *et e converso*. But, in natural sc., where we have demonstrations from extrinsic causes, something is proved of one thing by another that is quite extrinsic to the first. Hence it is that the rational mode is observed most of all in natural science.

and it is for this reason that natural science is, among the other sciences, ~~the~~ most in conformity with the human intellect. To proceed rationally is therefore attributed to natural science, not because natural sc. alone proceeds that way, but because it belongs principally to natural science.

What has been done so far.

11

I. Prolegomena on language of philosophy,
with special attention of some key words
in this treatise de Anima. ^{vague and exact knowledge, to}
Some remarks on the dist. between ^{common} and
proper conception.

II The place of the treatise de Anima in Aristotle's Corpus naturale
according to the ordo determinandi.

III the order of Aristotle's biological treatises.

IV. Book I: Arist's introduction to the doctrinal part
of the treatise.

Divided into two parts:

(i) Proem (c. 1): three parts:

(a) arouses willingness in listener:

by showing the worth and utility
of this science.

Worth because { for its own sake, and
certitude
wholly to other { ^{meta}
sciences. { ^{mor.}
nat.

(b) renders listener docile by
showing the way and the order
to be followed in this study.
This is done by showing what we after,
namely, to know what soul is,
and how we should try to know it,
i.e. by signs and demonstration.
Then we seek to know its properties.

He here points out that some of these "passions" or affections seem to help the soul alone (such as thought and contemplation), some of them are common to all animals, pleasure and sadness, sense and imagination.

(c) Thirdly, he draws attention by pointing out the difficulty of the ~~subject~~ treatise.

→ (a) The difficulty of knowing what soul is, for two reasons:

① The diff. of finding out how soul is to be defined, for, though useful, the sc. is diff. in that it is difficult to know what soul is or what way is this to be achieved. By demonstration? By division? (Plato) By composition?

② What are we to put into the definition and how are we to find what? For instance: regarding what soul is, what is to be the genus in the definition? Which of the categories? Which is the proximate genus to be assigned in the definition? Besides, in every genus, potency and act (like intellect). Again, some substances are composites, others simple. The soul?

Is soul a species? Do souls differ
by genus? Will the definition be one of
genus or of species?

For there are different opinions on this
subject. Are we to seek only one definition,
and is this all there is to be sought?
Or are there diverse kinds of soul
differing by definition?

[At this juncture St Thomas explains Aristotle's
position on the nature of universal.

- de animalibus universalibus 2^{us}
- A { sec. qd universale, ut
unum in multis aut
de multis.
 - B { sec. qd ut animal:
a) - vel sec. qd ut in rerum
natura
b) - vel sec. qd in intellectu

Plato voluit qd sec. a) animal universale aliquid
esset in rerum natura et esse prius particularibus,
quia posuit universalia separata et ideas.
Sec. Arist. nihil est in rebus. Et si est,
universum et posterius.

Si autem consideramus naturam universalem
non secundum quod subiectum intentioni
universalitati, sic aliquid est, et prius,
sicut qd est in potentia, prius est
quam id quod est actu.

→ (B) Difficulties regarding the power of the soul.
 Are the different powers different souls?
 (as the Platonist thought) Or are they
 potential parts of one and the same
 soul?
 And if so, must we first seek to know
 these parts? Or rather their acts first and
 then the powers of which these acts are
 the acts? And if first the acts, then, must
 we first ~~seek to know~~ ^{seek to know} the objects of these acts
 rather than the powers first?

→ (C) Diffic. about the things which, though
 extrinsic to the soul are nevertheless helpful
 to define it. For we need accidentals in
 defining, especially since ~~the~~ ^{essential} principles
 of things are unknown to us, we must
 therefore designate them by means of
 the appropriate external appearances.
 And yet, though we do not know
 offhand soul, we must eventually come
 to know it as first and then see it as
 the why of its properties. (Ex. from math.)
 Hence the greater difficulty of all. If this
 cannot be done, the definition of soul will
 not be real but dialectical.

All this about the difficulty of knowing what soul is.
 He now (403a) goes into the difficulty that arises
 from the nature and properties of soul.

→ (5) Diff. on the part of passions & properties.
 Some passions are not within the body. Are there others? (S.Th. I. 2, aa. 18-20)
 That there are passions (affections) of the composite. In this case, it is obvious that their consideration belong to natural science.

But it is also a fact that there are defined without their subject, matter, sensitive matter. When this occurs, the definitions are only dialectical, not natural. E.g., via.

Diff. between dialectical, natural, and mathem. d.

Significatio: Why are some definitions called dialectical?
 Just what does this mean?

De An. II, c. 2

A. restate Briefly Phys. I/c.

But here he has demonstration in mind,
as is plain from what he says immediately hereafter. The soul has already been defined, and this at the term of a discourse, c. 1. But only figuratively and descriptively, superficially. This is a case similar to defining squaring in geometry as the finding of an equilateral rectangle equal to one that is not equilateral, where we merely state the conclusion of a discourse. But when we show that squaring a rectangle is the finding of a mean proportional, we give the cause of the thing.

Notice here what S. Thomas says about this comparison, n. 152

S. Th. 245-6.

412 b10-16

9 dei. 63

And so it has been stated in a general way what soul is. For it is a substance ~~in the sense of~~ by way of logos, ratio, notion, form. And this is the ~~what it is of this kind of body~~ being of this sort of body: [i.e., the reason that body is alive.] somewhat as if a tool such as an axe were a natural body, its form (or shape) what makes it an axe would be its substance (in the sense of form), and so its soul. If the shape [of the material] were removed from it, the axe would no longer be an 'axe', except in an ambiguous sense; ~~for it is not an axe~~ It is in fact just an axe [and not a natural body]. For it is not of this kind of body that the soul is the being and form, but of a natural body that has in itself a principle of motion and rest. What has been said must be made plain by means of the parts [of a living thing]. If the eye were an animal, ~~sight would be its soul~~ ^{likewise} be its sight, for sight is the substance of the eye, ~~according to which~~ ^{which} tells what it is to be an eye. ^{For} the eye is the material of sight, and when sight fails, it is no longer an eye except equivocally, as a stone or painted eye. And so we must ^{see} ~~know~~ what ^{is} ~~is~~ of the part, ~~what~~ ^{holds of the whole} in the whole living body. For what a part is in proportion to part, so is the whole ~~same sense~~ ^{as a whole} to the whole sense-endowed body as such.

It is not that which lacks soul that is potentially capable of ~~dispositive~~ living, but only that which has soul. True, seeds or pods and ~~forests~~ are potentially live bodies [i.e., are in potency with respect to the body that has soul]. Waking life is an actuality as the axe's cutting and the eye's seeing are; soul is an actuality as the sense of sight and the power of the axe are; and the body is ~~that~~ ^{that which is} by way of potentiality. But as the pupil and the sight make an eye, the body and soul make an animal.

Quid sit anima, in communi. Ordo doctrinae.

1° Quid sit anima.

- (a) definitio quae sit quasi conclusio demonstr^{na}.
 (b) " " " " principium " (C.2) lect. 3-4
- Nam definitio { aut dem^{na} conclusio
 aut " principium (I Pot. An, 8, lect. 16)
 aut a " diff. primum

In prima ponit def. animae.

[In secunda manifestat eam (412b10)]

Præmittit quasdam divisiones, quibus habetur via ad investignd def. 2^a.

Ponit duas div.:

- (a) nec. ad investig. id qd in def. ponitur ad exp^{rim}. dam essentiam ipsi.
 (b) alia " " " " " " subjectum ipsius.

Circa (a), tri. div.

(α) in praedicamenta

(β) subst. { mat.
 forma

compos.: hoc aliquid. cf. 215.

(γ) actus { primus n. 216 { pot.
 secundus { actus: pot. ↓
 actus

(α) substantiae ped. corporeae,
 pedum incorporeae. (Subst., qd no, primo in consuetudine
 ad mat.)

(β) corpora naturalia et corp. artif.

(γ) corpora quae habent vitam; quae non. n. 219.

Definitio:

Omne corpus habens vitam et corpus pluriplacum.

Omne " " " " substantia.

Sed corpus et eius actus, ergo substantia composita.

Corpus habens vitam duo dicitur:

- et corpus

- et hujusmodi corpus.

Hinc illa pars corporis habens vitam, quae pars dicitur corpus, sit anima. Ratio: per animam intelligimus "id quo habens vitam vivit. Est ergo anima quid in subjecto sistens. Cf. 220.

Nota valde quod ipsum corpus non est ut pot. ad actum, sed actus actus ipsius corporis et ratione cuius ipsum corpus est corpus.

Cf. ~~Metaph.~~ F. Nuyens,

L'Évol. de la pensée
d'Aristote, tome 2, 98.

P. 266, sur entéléchie.

D. ALBERTI MAGNI,

RATISBONENSIS EPISCOPI,

ORDINIS PRÆDICATORUM

LIBER PRIMUS

DE ANIMA.

TRACTATUS I

DE MODO QUO COGNOSCENDA EST ANIMA.

CAPUT I.

Et est digressio declarans, quod scientia naturalis est de anima, et quis ejus ordo.

Omnibus quæ de corpore mobili, et de mobili secundum locum dicenda erant expeditis, traditis etiam eis quæ de mobilibus ad formam tam simplicibus quam mixtis in universali videbantur esse dicenda, determinatis nihilominus his quæ de mixtura lapidum et minerarum commemoranda esse videbantur: nunc tandem stilum ad tractandum animatorum naturas convertimus, ordinem quem in principio nostrorum librorum præscri-

psimus, per omnia insequendo. Cum autem omnium animatorum principium sit anima, non poterunt animata cognosci nisi per cognitionem suarum animarum, sicut et unumquodque aliorum non cognoscitur nisi per formam suam, quod forma est et principium esse et cognitionis. Oportet ergo hanc de necessitate nos de anima facere inquisitionem, antequam de corporibus animatorum aliquid possumus disserere. Sunt autem animæ opera et passionēs, sicut sentire, dormire, et vigilare, et nutrire, et spirare, et mors, et vita, de quibus omnibus et similibus, sicut est reminisci et movere, debet sciri post scientiam de Anima: quia ex illis plurimum dirigere videtur in scientia animatorum corporum.

Licet ergo anima et opera ejus et passionēs non sint corpus mobile quod est subjectum philosophiæ naturalis, est tamen anima principium essentiāle talis

Occurrit
tācitæ ob-
jecti.

LIBER II

DE ANIMA

SECUNDUM SUBSTANTIAM ET PARTES EJUS, QUÆ SUNT
VEGETABILIS, SENSIBILIS ET RATIONALIS.

TRACTATUS I

DE SUBSTANTIA ANIMÆ SECUNDUM SE.

CAPUT I.

Quæ sit libri intentio, et qualiter diffinitionem animæ venari contingit.

Text. et com.
I.

Hæc igitur quæ dicta sunt, tradita sunt a prioribus Philosophis de anima, in quibus quia nihil est conveniens substantiæ animæ, vel ejus partibus, oportet nos omnia ea, ut ostendimus, abjicere. Re-deamus autem iterum tanquam ex principio quod supra nobis præfiximus, ad

inquirendum primo de substantia, et postea de partibus et operibus et accidentibus ejus. Et quæramus determinare quid est anima ratione communi et figurali sive superficiali, et etiam quæ utique sit ipsius essentialis et propria diffinitio, quæ non dicit tantum quid est anima, sed etiam dicit causam propter quid unumquodque operum et accidentium inest : quia, sicut diximus superius in præmissis, si per diffinitionem non conjecturatur facile de accidentibus, dialectica erit et vana. Venientes autem diffinitionem primo quæ tantum quid est anima dicit, dicamus quod nos non disputamus utrum anima sit in generibus accidentium : quoniam scitum est ab omnibus accedens partem substantiæ non esse,

I. Quid sit: I. Phys., lect. 15, nn. 9 & 10. - Non est aliqua actio materiae: De Pot., q. 4, a. 1, ad 2. - Jean de s. Thomas, Curs. Phil., T. II, pp. 78-80.

II. Utrum oporteat "quod in ulteriorem et perfectissimum actum quem materia consequi potest tendat appetitus materiae quo appetit formam, sicut in ultimum finem generationis". C. Gentiles, III, 22.

Or, Jean de s. Thomas semble dire ~~Exxxxxxxx~~ nettement le contraire, p. 79b. En outre, s. Thomas lui-même s'exprime dans les mêmes termes en l'endroit auquel renvoie Jean de s. Thomas: Ia, q. 66, a. 2, c. - On le voit, l'argument est appuyé sur le principe: "potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum".

Cependant, l'argument C.G. III, 22: "Quum vero, ut dictum est, quaelibet res mota..." est démonstratif. Comment concilier cette apparente contradiction?

III. Avant de passer à une solution tentative, considérons les points suivants:

1. La fin ultime à laquelle est ordonnée la matière, c'est la forme en tant qu'elle est quelque chose de divin, i.e. une participation de l'acte pur: I Phys., c. 9, lect. 15, n. 7. Ajoutez à cette idée l'argument de C.G. III, c. 22.

2. Si la matière était indifférente au degré de perfection de la forme, le degré de perfection de la forme serait accidentel. Il en suivrait que la matière tendrait "per se" vers la forme de corporéité, "per accidens" vers des formes plus parfaites. On tomberait ainsi dans l'erreur que Jean de s. Thomas veut éviter, p. 79b9-17. Du reste, on ne voit pas comment la matière et la forme pourraient constituer un "unum per se". Cette position met en question l'unité de la forme substantielle.

3. La perfection de la matière ne consiste pas dans l'actuation successive en tant que successive. La succession des formes devrait être indéfiniment continuée. La matière ne peut pas avoir la succession en acte: celle-ci comporte un constant au-delà. Le terme d'une semblable succession est irréalisable. (De Pot., q. 5, a. 5, c.)

4. Si la matière est indifférente au degré de perfection de la forme, les formes seront homogènes par rapport à l'appétit de la ~~xxx~~ matière. D'où les deux conséquences: (a) elle poursuit le multiple purement numérique, ce qui est impossible, car "nullum agens intendit pluralitatem materialem ut finem, quia materialis multitudo repugnat rationi finis." Ia, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2; (b) cette poursuite serait futile pour une autre raison: les nouvelles formes ne lui donneraient aucun acte nouveau comme forme. En d'autres termes: la matière tendrait vers l'acte en faisant un retour sur elle-même dans l'indéfinie diffusion de la multiplicité matérielle dont la ~~xxx~~ matière est elle-même le fait le plus accompli.

5. Si la matière était indifférente au degré de perfection de la forme, et notez que la forme est essentiellement "species", il faudrait en conclure que "forma est propter materiam", que les formes ne sont désirées que

comme termes provisoires d'un irréalisable multiple indéfini: toute forme, quelle qu'elle soit, présente ou future, serait victime de l'appétit de la matière: la forme n'existerait que pour assouvir un appétit inassouissable. Par conséquent la forme naturelle serait par sa nature même inadéquate. Et si l'on disait que l'appétit de la matière atteint son objet dans la succession des formes, il s'ensuivrait, il me semble, que la succession serait la forme désirée. (Ia, q. 47, a. 2, c.)

6. On pourrait objecter que la matière n'est pas ordonnée principalement aux formes individuelles, mais à la perfection de l'univers tout entier. Or, le principe sur lequel est appuyée cette objection confirme notre position. La perfection de l'univers est en effet nécessairement la fin de la matière. Rien n'est ordonné à la matière, et celle-ci est une relation transcendente. Or, la perfection de l'univers consiste dans son unité d'ordre: "Nam id quod est optimum, maxime habet rationem finis intenti. Optimum autem in rerum universitate est bonum ordinis; hoc enim est bonum commune, caetera vero sunt singularia bona." (De subst. separatis, c. 10) Or cette unité d'ordre n'est pas constituée de parties homogènes, par la distinction matérielle. (Sur la différence entre "tout homogène" et tout hétérogène" cf Ia, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2; pour "distinctio materialis" et "distinctio formalis", Ia, q. 47, a. 2, c.) "quia enim aliquod totum perfectum fit, secundum hoc diversas partes et inaequales ad ejus compositionem conducit. Si enim omnes essent aequales, jam non esset totum perfectum: quod patet tam in toto naturali quam in toto civili. Non enim esset corpus hominis perfectum, nisi membra diversa et inaequalis dignitatis haberet; neque esset civitas perfecta, nisi inaequales conditiones et officia diversa in civitate existerent." (De subst. separ., c. 10)

Plus les formes sont parfaites, plus elles sont essentielles à la perfection de l'univers. (cf de Spir. Creat., a. 8, ~~xx~~, c.) Bien que l'homme soit venu le dernier, il est essentiel à la perfection du monde, et avec les anges il est essentiel à la perfection de l'univers tout entier. "...nam homo ordinatur ad perfectionem universi ut essentialis pars ipsius". (de Pot., q. 5, a. 10, c.)

Cf. surtout, de Pot., q. 5, ~~xxix~~ a. 9, c.; CG. IV, c. 97.

Donc, si la matière tend vers la perfection de l'univers, et si cette perfection n'est réalisée que par les formes plus parfaites, elle tend davantage vers ces formes. Si elle était indifférente au degré de perfection de ces formes, elle serait indifférente à sa raison d'être.

IV. Solution de la difficulté. Il est très certain que la contradiction que nous tentons de dissoudre n'est qu'apparente.

1. Notez bien la précision des termes employés par s. Thomas: "potentia quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum". Il ne considère pas la matière dans la perspective de toutes les causes, il considère la matière simplement comme capacité. Or si nous considérons l'appétit de la matière comme l'appétit de tout de dont elle est capable, il est entendu qu'il s'étend également à toutes les formes. Il en est de même dans le cas de la connaissance: notre intelligence s'étend à toutes choses "sub ratione entis", tant à l'imparfait qu'au parfait. Il s'agit donc simplement de la capacité de la matière. En effet, si la matière était plus apte à avoir les formes plus parfaites, les formes inférieures n'auraient aucune raison d'être: elles seraient contraires à l'appétit de la matière. Pour comprendre cette manière de parler, il faut résolument faire abstraction de la causalité finale. Bien que Jean de

III

s. Thomas parle de "finis et perfectio materiae" (p. 79b43), il s'agit toujours de la fin et de la perfection de la matière considérée en elle-même, i.e. comme pure capacité dont il reste à déterminer la fin principale et dernière. Cette considération séparée de la matière première n'est pas sans difficulté.

2. Mais il est très important de marquer qu'on ne peut pas isoler les textes de s. Thomas de leur contexte. Il faut toujours tenir compte de l'endroit où ils se trouvent. Or, le texte en question se trouve dans la deuxième partie de la I^a pars où il s'agit de Dieu cause efficiente. Plus spécialement la q. 66 se trouve dans la section où s. Thomas traite des créatures "tam quoad naturam eorum et essentiam, quam quoad proprietates et operationes, et productionem in esse". (J. s. T., Curs. Theol., I, p. 147). L'étude de Dieu comme cause finale est réservée à la III^a Pars. Il n'était donc pas nécessaire de parler de finalité absolue de la matière première.

D'autre ~~ex~~ part, le texte de la CG qui semble contredire celui de la I^a Pars, est tiré du livre III, lequel traite "de ordine creaturarum in deum sicut in finem." (Sylvester Ferrarionensis, Comment. in III C.G., c. 1) Et de même que la matière est présentée ici comme tendant principalement vers la forme humaine, de même la connaissance de Dieu est la fin de toute substance intellectuelle, et l'argument dont se sert s. Thomas (c. 25, "Adhuc, unumquodque tendit in divinam similitudinem sicut in proprium finem...") est fondé sur les mêmes principes employés au c. 22.

3. Pourquoi ces différentes perspectives entraînent-elles des conséquences aussi importantes? La réponse gît dans le principe: "Bonum est ~~non~~ diffusivum sui". Mais il faut l'entendre au sens que lui accorde s. Thomas: "Cum autem dicitur quod bonum est diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda effusio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita. Dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis, et non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, in quantum huiusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis initium; tum quia effectus participat causam efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum; sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni." (De Ver., q. 21, a. 1, ad 4) Donc, si nous faisons abstraction de la finalité, nous ne pouvons pas connaître la véritable "mensura et perfectio" de la matière.

Ce n'est donc que dans la perspective de la fin absolument dernière que la matière tend vers l'âme humaine "sicut in ultimam formam" et que cette âme "est finis omnium formarum naturalium". (De Spir. Crea., a. 2, c)

Notes trouvées dans le De Caelo, livre
utilisé par CDK pour ses cours.

260

Generatio minus, privatio alterius:

l. 7, n. 6

forma in viam speciem: l. 8, n. 3.

magis generatio: l. 8, n. 8.

Principium: l. 10, nn. 7-9.

Parmenides: all things are indivisibly ^{single} one thing.

Remember the reason: "scientia". Our scientia measured by things in their multiplicity. This we know. Eventually we come to realize that ~~the~~ though things are multiple and their perfection cannot be otherwise realized; the multiplying of our means of knowing flows from the imperfection of our mind. There is a mind which is utterly one and which embraces all undivided.

If Parm.'s one be taken as a myth, leading to this kind of one, acceptable.

Heracitus: all things contrary

"... car les dimensions doivent être déterminées, et les dimensions déterminées sont des droites perpendiculaires; or il n'est pas possible de trouver plus que trois droites ~~non~~ ^{non} les angles qui sont à des angles droits l'une par rapport aux autres; par conséquent, si une autre dimension était ajoutée après la troisième, elle ne serait nullement mesurable ni déterminable." Ptolémée, Τερί Σελήτης.

Les trois dimensions peuvent être représentées par des expressions algébriques:

- la longueur d'une ligne par une expression linéaire;
- l'aire d'une surface par " " quadratique;
- le solide par une expression cubique

Ande, passage à express. bi-quadratiques: 4 dimensions.
Inde, ~~infini~~ ^{infini} space à n dimensions. Différents sorts
d' space à un nombre infini dimensions.

A semper esse
B semper non esse

C Non semper esse
D Non semper non esse } E { albedo non esse
albedo esse

n. 5. Conclusio.

"Semper existens" et "semper non existens" n'est ni engendré ni corruptible. D'autre part, inversement, l'engendré ni le corruptible ne sont toujours,

ni quant à l'être ni quant au non être.

Le contraire de cette position entraînerait qu'une chose puisse être toujours et à la fois n'être pas toujours. Or, être toujours et n'être pas toujours sont contradictoirement opposés.

n. 6. Tout ce qui est engendré et incorruptible (au sens propre) est toujours. Engendré au sens propre, ce qui maintenant est de telle sorte qu'il ne peut pas être de dire auparavant qu'il n'était pas. Incorruptible au sens propre, ce qui maintenant est de telle sorte qu'il ne sera pas vrai de dire qu'il n'est pas. Or, si une ingeneratum est incorruptibile, et omne incorruptibile ingeneratum, necesse est quod semper eternum consequatur ad utrumque.

(Voir fin n. 7)

Lect. 28: Engendré et corruptible se suivent; semblablement inengendré et incorruptible.

- Si une chose est corruptible elle est engendrée.
1. ~~Genitum consequitur ad corruptibile.~~
Nisi corruptibile sit genitum, il faudrait qu'il fût inengendré.
Or inengendré et incorruptible sont convertibles; donc, quelque chose de corruptible serait incorruptible.
~~Si une chose est corruptible elle est aussi nécessairement~~
2. Si une chose est ~~corruptible~~ est engendrée, elle est corruptible.
L'engendré est ou corruptible ou incorruptible.
Or l'incorruptible est inengendré - puisque convertible.
Donc l'engendré serait inengendré.
Donc tout corruptible est engendré.
3. Engendré et corruptible se convertissent.

Entre "être toujours" et "toujours n'être pas" il y a un intermédiaire qui est la négation des deux.
Or, être pendant un temps limité et n'être pas pendant un temps limité appartient tant à l'engendré qu'au corruptible.
Donc la chose dite engendrée s'attribue encore être corruptible, et inversement. Donc l'un suit l'autre.

~~4. Objection (n° 3)~~

4. Objection: l'intermédiaire entre l'être blanc et noir est multicolore.
(Rép., leçon suivante).

5. Inengendré et incorruptibles sont convertibles.
Inengendré et engendré ne peuvent appartenir à la même chose, mais une chose est ou l'un ou l'autre.
Ce même vaut pour ~~l'incorruptible~~ et corruptible.
Or, on a montré que ce qui est engendré et corruptible.
Donc, si l'incorruptible est ~~inengendré~~ inengendré n'est pas incorruptible, l'incorruptible pourra être engendré.
Or tout engendré est corruptible. Donc l'incorruptible serait corruptible, ce qui est impossible.
Donc: tout corruptible est engendré, et inversement; et tout incorruptible est inengendré, et inversement.

IIa Ratio : Selon l'opinion émise, ce qui a toujours été
 ou n'a pas toujours été, avait à tout instant la
 puissance pour l'opposé - soit pour n'être pas que
~~il~~ il était, soit pour être qu'il n'était pas.
 donc, pendant un temps infini, elle avait la
 puissance ^{d'être} pendant tout ce temps où elle était,
 ou d'être pendant le temps où elle n'était pas.

IIIa Ratio : Si une chose est indépendante et corruptible, elle
 avait toujours la puissance de n'être pas. Et s'il y
 avait quelque chose d'engendré qui auparavant n'était
 pas dans un temps infini, pendant tout ce temps
 infini elle pouvait devenir. donc, ce qui se pose
 comme ayant été pendant un temps infini, pouvait
 pendant tout ce ^m temps, n'être pas; et ce qui pendant
 tout ce temps n'eût pas, pouvait être dans ce
 m temps. donc elle pouvait à la fois être et n'être
 pas au cours du m temps. Improbable.

Il s'ensuit également l'impossibilité d'une chose corruptible
 qui ne serait pas à un temps donné. Sinon, cette
 chose aurait la puissance de n'être pas, c'à d. qu'elle
 serait en m temps incorruptible. Elle serait donc
 toujours (semper) corruptible et incorruptible, possible
 d'être toujours et de n'être pas toujours en m temps.
 Improbable. Car, ce qui peut être toujours, n'est et toujours;
 donc elle ne peut pas ne pas être toujours.

Si l'engendré était incorruptible ou l'engendré corruptible;
 mêmes inconvénients. (Ce serait la négation de la
 potentia simul contradictoires.)

Objection : L'incorporel éternel aurait une puissance de
n'être pas, non pas ~~de l'avenir~~ ^{par rapport à} l'avenir mais ^{par rapport au} ~~l'avenir~~ passé.
de m pour l'éternel incorporel.

Impossible. L'ordre du temps ne peut s'inverser. ~~2e~~ Nulle
~~puissance~~ ~~puissance~~ ne regarde ce qui s'est
fait dans le passé, mais ce qui est dans le présent ou
l'avenir. On ne peut plus faire que le temps déjà
écoulé ne soit pas, c'est ne soit pas écoulé.

Opiniones de sup'cti haeretur de Caelo:

Alexandri: ipsum universum, de quo principaliter.

* à Ath. fin II^e s.

Alii: corpus coeleste qd circulariter movetur.

de aliis corp. in fluxu et refluxu recipiunt.

(Ita Jamblicus) huc, simplicitati de Caelo per accidens. de corp. singl. ad similitudinem.

Alii: det. de simplicibus corporibus. Quia si

de universo, oportet ut sita et deinde cor. movet.

ad omnes partes, unde et animalia et ad plantas;

Sicut Plato in Timaeo.

Contra hoc: in hoc libro, de corporib. et sec.

Circularitatem et gravitatem.

Rationalior sententia Alexandri. n. 5.

Recl. I

Vu dans sa totalité l'univers surtout quantitatif.

Mvt local plus parfait. Quom?

Quom motus mot.

Première "actuation" qd ad denominationem.

de Caelo. Proseem.

2. 2. In consid. practica 4x ordo: *quod.*

(a) apprehensionis: forma domus
[cf. Met. I, l. 2, 7. 49.]
absolute, postea videtur in mat.
de conceptione de et essere, esse
communem.

(α) a communibus ad min. comm.

Partic. eodem ac singularia, ut
patet exemplo

(b) intentionis: sec. qd. arch/pt
intendit totam domum
peripere.

(β) a toto ad partes: sec. qd.
totum est prius in consideratione
quam partes, quae partes
sunt sec. materiam et place
sunt individui. Partes speciei
autem sunt priores in consideratione
quam totum.

(c) compositionis, prius dicitur
lapides, postea coniungit eos
in unum parietem.

(γ) a simplicibus ad composita,
sec. qd. compositum cognoscitur per simplicitatem

(d) enumerationis, prius facit
fundamentum domus, super
qd. extrinsecum.

(δ) principales partes prius considerantur,
sicut cor, hepar, quam arteriae
et sanguinem.

Hic 4x ordo in ^{processu} scia. nat. est

(α) determinandum comm., in Phys., 1^o
2^o In aliis libris appl. comm. ad
propria subiecta.

Alii tractatus ergo 1^o de Caelo: tri-

- bia (1) Totum prius.
- (2) Simplicia prius quam mixta.
- (3) de Caeli corpore, sec. qd.
alia eo firmantur.

Performance du com. corpore.

Com. corpore et l'universelle.
des corps comme un tout.
Tendre vers com. distincte.

cf. de Hyle n. lect. 1.
En réalité, limite à l'infini
n'est pas là de Ceto.

peu nécessite de spécialisation.
Hyle perdu au vu de tout
nécessaire com.

des universaux des corps - au corps.

des corps, on trouve un
niveau au com. - l'indivisible.

Com. au point. indivisible:
l'indivisible, car, ce n'est
pas en elle que l'union fait
un tout à l'indivisible.

① *Metaphysica* ad considerandum *etiam* *spec.*

② *A* *epimutibus* ad *mutua* *communia*.
cf. *Metaph.* I, lect. 2, n. 46.

③ *A* *totis* ad *partes* *que* *sunt* *secundum*
modum *et* *indivisibile*
"Metaphysica *in* *partes*", i.e.
partes *speciei*.

④ *A* *simplicibus* ad *composita*.

⑤ *A* *mutabilibus* *partes*

Creatio

parva
actua

formata: relatio: comparationem:

∴ facio relationem formatam et opus
comparationem unius ad alterum.

Relatio alia formari et intellectui:

{ ut copula
ut intentio: operatio.

Apud naturalem intendit terminum ut in se.

" intellectuale potius intendit ordinem ut terminum.

Ultima ratio: intellectus reflectit supra seipsum,

ut patet in descriptionem identitatis.

Et hoc sequitur, scilicet pura immanet,

ut relatio necessarii et ut patet in eodem.

[Ad hanc in qualiter procedit ratio: videtur
enim per quatuor terminos ad animam, animae
non ad hanc.]

De libro I, Proem.

n. 1. "a primis" - viz. universalia in procedendo.

cf. Phys. II, l. 6.

Pergit elementa? cf. Phys. I,

lect. 1, n. 5.

Notes "procedens" et quia ordinem ordinem.

mihi et ergo me et ob id et non autem
de la ration, meum et ob id et non autem
necesse est eorum de la ration.

Tamen, eorum de la ration in

a prima de ergo, etiam quia in

procedit a me ordine de rationem
autem rationem. Deinde in rationem,

et est la rationem "ab uno in alio."

Plus manifeste in rationem rationem, sed,

primis

n. 2. In ob rationem, et procedens "a primis
autem rationem", cad. "de primis procedens me."

In rationem procedens:

① apud rationem: forma divina abstracta,
deinde indicat in materiam.

② ordo intentionum: indicat totum dom. simpliciter.

cf. Ia q. 14, a. 16, 17, Secunda, et q.

③ comparatio:

④ lucida rationem, pro ratione, ut fundamētum.

VIII. - Ad hujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod ordinatio est duplex; altera activa altera passiva; passiva quidam est ordo ipse, prout invenitur in rebus ordinatis, sive inter se, sive ad unum tertium: activa autem ordinatio est actio procedens ad alterum ordinandum, et ponendum ordinem in rebus. Potest autem poni ordo in rebus dupliciter. Uno modo quasi materialiter faciendo res, quae suscipiunt ordinem, quod est ordinare ex parte materiae; alio modo formalissime ex parte ipsius ordinis; ita quod ordo ipse sit primo, et per se intentus a tali agente. Non autem dicitur ordinare id quod facit ordinem primo modo, sed secundo: quod enim habet ordinem a casu, et quasi materialiter non dicitur fieri ab agente ordinante, quia non fit sub ratione, et intentione ordinis, sed ex alia intentione processit res ipsas habere ordinem, sicut si ab aliquo agente naturali casu fieret aliquod artefactum, verbi gratia domus, vel statua. Igitur certum esse debet, quod ordinare formalissime loquendo, importat actionem ordinis, habendo pro ratione formali, et intenta ipsum ordinem: ad illam ergo potentiam primo, et per se pertinet ordinare ad quam primo, et per se pertinet habere pro formali objecto ordinem. Ordo autem, ut dicit S. Thomas supra quaest. XXVI, articulo primo, includit adum aliquem prioris, et posterioris secundum relationem ad aliquod principium; relatio autem non potest primo, et per se intendi, nisi ab agente intellectuali, quia agens intendens relationem formaliter, oportet, quod formaliter sit comparativum, quia relatio nascitur in aliquo ex eo quod comparatur ad aliud extra se. Unde faciens relationem formaliter est agens comparativum unius ad alterum, quod nulli agenti naturali convenire potest; omne enim agens intendit producere rem in esse, ponendo illam extra causas; et ideo semper intendit esse in, nonvero esse ad. Qua ratione (ut dicitur in quinto physicorum) relatio ut relatio, non est terminus primarius alicujus agentis; nullum ergo agens naturale est primo, et per se formaliter comparativum, et ordinarium, quod est directe intendere relationem et ordinem.

IX. - Similiter neque appetitus, et voluntas est primo, et per se agens comparativum, quia modus agendi per se appetitus est per ordinem ad res in se. Cum enim voluntas non trahat res ad se, sed potius trahatur ad res, non pertinet ad illam comparare unam rem ad alteram, sed inclinari ad res ipsas secundum bonitatem, qua sunt appetibiles. Et ita si modus ejus agendi est trahi a bonitate rei, non relinquitur ei locus, ut de una re faciat ordinationem ad alteram. Intellectus autem qui trahit res ad se, et ex una procedit ad alteram, potest comparare, et attingere formaliter habitudinem unius ad alterum: habet ergo intellectus in se primam radicem, et primam rationem ordinandi res; sicut et comparandi et instituendi habitudinem unius ad alteram. Appetitus autem non habet in se radicem comparandi, sed solum tendendi ad res, prout in se sunt per modum ponderis, et inclinationis ad bonitatem, quam habent. Unde nisi supponantur comparatae inter se, et habitudinem, habentes, appetitus non facit ipsam comparisonem, et habitudinem, quia appetitus non facit sibi objectum, cum non habeat illud intra se, neque formet illud sicut intellectus, sed ab exteriori bonitate, et appetibilitate trahatur. Qua ratione appetitus in ordine ad suum objectum est potentia magis passiva quam intellectus, ut determinat D. Thomas 1-2, quaest. XXI, art. II.

X. - Restat ergo, quod si appetitus fertur in res ordinatas, hanc ordinationem ipse appetitus non faciat, sed supponat; potentia autem primo et per se ordinans, et faciens habitudinem ordinis est potentia intellectiva, quia haec habet in se radicem ordinandi, et comparandi, eo quod non fertur ad res, nec traditur ab illis sed trahit eas ad se, et intra se format, et concipit, et comparat. Et inde est quod etiam ipsa virtus charitatis, quae est suprema in voluntate, et attingens ultimum finem,

non est primo, et per se ordinans, sed ordinata, juxta illud Cant. I : Ordinavit in me charitatem. Ex que colligit S. Thomas supra quaest. XXVI, art. I, quod charitas habet ordinem in objectis diligendis, non quasi ordinans, sed quasi ordinata, quia ordinare, inquit, rationis est, charitas autem ordinata habet ordinare reliquas virtutes: e contrario vero intellectui attribuitur ordinare primo, et per se, juxta illud commune dictum philosophi: Sapientis est ordinare.

XI. - Dices: Haec habitudo, quam format intellectus intra se, solum est relatio rationis, quia est relatio facta ab intellectu: ergo ex hoc non poterit ratio practica causare ordinationem realem, sed solum rationis; hoc autem est falsum, nam artificialia, quae procedunt a ratione practica per artem, important ordinationem realem in rebus ipsis existentem; sicut artefactum domus est aliquid realiter ordinatum secundum partes suas. Et similiter moralitas actuum, quae procedit a ratione practica secundum regulas rationis, et prudentiae, dicit respectum realem ad regulas rationis.

XII. - Respondetur, quod relatio dupliciter potest formari intra intellectum, uno modo in quantum est praecise cognita, alio modo ut intenta, et ut finis. Intellectus enim practicus, et speculativus differunt fine, quia speculativus est propter cognosci; practicus autem propter opus. Et ideo potest aliqua relatio formari ab intellectu, vel propter cognosci tantum ipsius relationis, et sic solum acquirit relatio esse cognitum, et est relatio rationis: vel potest formare relationem intellectus propter operari ipsius relationis, intendendo illam exhibere in re, et sic non est relatio rationis, sed operabilis a ratione. Itaque relatio, seu habitudo ut intenta, non est relatio solum cognita, et consistens tantum in cognosci, sed derivabilis a cognitione ad rem: et ideo potest inveniri realiter; relatio autem quae solum cognoscitur, vel ex cognitione resultat, et non intenditur ut ponenda in re, est relatio rationis: ratio autem practica non solum formet relationem, et ordinem, praecise cognoscendo illum, sed tamquam opus faciendum, et ponendum in re. Et ideo bene stat, quod in artificialibus et moralibus ordo descendens a ratione practica sit realis; sed quia formaliter non potest intendere istum ordinem nisi comparando unum extremum ad alterum, ideo oportet, quod ordinare pertineat ad potentiam comparativam, et cognoscitivam. Et quod intellectus practicus formet hoc modo ordinem, et relationem, patet ex eo quia opus faciendum, verbi gratia, domus fabricanda formatur intra intellectum artificis, non tamen domus est aliquid rationis, sed aliquid factibile in re; sic etiam ordo ponendus inter ipsas partes domus, ut inter lapides et ligna, est ordo intentus ab artifice, et formatus ab intellectu practico; et ideo non est relatio rationis.

XIII. - Stabilito ergo hoc principio, quod ordinare, formaliter loquendo, est actus rationis, restat applicare illud ad actus particulares, et videre, an substantialiter sit formalis ordinatio. Ad hoc ergo cognoscendum in istis actibus, qui pendunt a duplici potentia, mota et movente, elicienda est regula quaedam ex D. Thoma 1-e, quaest. XIII, articulo primo, quod semper id, in quo perficitur huiusmodi actus, est quod materialiter, et substantialiter a se habet in illo: et ideo ad illam potentiam pertinebit, ut ad motam, et directe, a qua habet id in quo perficitur talis actus; et ad illam potentiam pertinebit praesuppositive, et ut ad moventem a qua habet quasi inchoationem, et ordinem incipiendi, secundum quem ordinem fit talis actus. Hac regula utitur S. Thomas ad ostendendum, quod electio est actus voluntatis, et non rationis, loco proxime citato: "Quia, inquit, perficitur electio in motu quodam animae ad bonum, quod eligitur: et ideo electio actus est appetitivae potentiae." Quid sit autem id, in quo perficitur electio, explicavit idem sanctus doctor quaestione XXII de veritate, articulo XV, ubi inquit: "Quod ultima acceptio, qua aliquid accipitur ad prosequendum, est electio, quod quidem non est rationis,

quia quantumcumque ratio unum alteri praeferat, nondum unum est alteri praeacceptum ad operandum, quousque voluntas inclinatur magis in unum, quam in aliud." Haec D. Thomas. Et eandem doctrinam insinuavit in II, dist. XXIV, quaest. I, art. III.

XIV. - Itaque considerandum est, quod actus, qui procedit ab aliqua potentia non absolute, sed prout mevetur ab altera, et sic dependet a potentia mota et movente, talis actus procedit, ut motus quidam, cujus initium est in potentia movente, et exercitium est per potentiam motam, in qua perficitur motus, quia in ea attingit rem, et objectum, quod intendit. Videmus enim in motu corporali, quo quando concurrat ad aliquem motum potentia movens, et potentia mota, ut manus, et haculus, motus non attingit lapidem, prout indipit a manu, sed prout exercetur in baculo: et ideo ibi perficitur ubi ultimate attingit lapidem. Et similiter quando mare fluit ex motu lunae, quia talis motus non perficitur in coelo, sed in mari, ideo pertinet ultimate ad mare, et in illo subjectatur, et illud denominat, non vero lunam.

XV. - Sic ergo in istis actibus, qui non pertinent ad aliquam potentiam absolute, sed prout mevetur ab altera, attendendum est id, in quo perficitur motus, et quod ultimate intenditur, et ad illam pertinebit substantialiter, et materialiter, et illam denominabit, et in illa erit subjective. Verbi gratia imperium dicimus, quod pertinet substantialiter ad intellectum, et subjectatur in illo; praesuppositivo autem ad voluntatem, ut patet ex illa doctrina D. Thomae quaest. XXII de Veritate supra citata, quia quantumcumque movet voluntas, non tamen habet in voluntate ultimam in quo imperium perficitur, et quod intendit, quia cum imperium sit motio voluntatis ad alterum, ut moveat alterius voluntatem, vel potentiam ad exequendum, oportet quod non moveat illum motione caeca, sed manifestativa eius, quod debet fieri. Unde per manifestationem, quasi per baculum debet movere, et sic debet manifestare ipsi voluntati moventi, ut moveatur, et imperare. Si ipsi voluntati moventi, restat tunc hanc motionem, et manifestationem differre ad alterum, cui vult imperare: et hoc non potest facere voluntas per seipsam, sed indiget media manifestatione intellectus, (747) qua deferat ad alterum. Similiter si manifestatio illa inciperet flori erga alterum deinde autem moveret voluntas, remanet eadem difficultas, quomodo possit ista motio voluntatis deferri ad alterum, ut moveatur ab illa, nisi manifestando illam alteri; quae manifestatio est actus intellectus. Quia ergo imperium est motio voluntatis delata ad alterum, quod voluntarie debet voluntarium mobile, indiget manifestatione, et directione, et ideo perfici debet actu isto intellectus. Electio autem, et intentio, quia non debet deferri ad alterum, sed in ipsa voluntate perfici tendendo in objectum collatum, et ordinatum, ideo inchoatur ab ordinatione, qua proponitur sibi objectum collatum, et perficitur motu voluntatis tendente ad tale objectum.

XVI. - Neque obstat, quod voluntas etiam imperat sibi ipsi, aut etiam intellectui, et reliquis potentiis, respectu quarum non videtur indigere delatione suae motionis ad alterum per manifestationem. Respondetur enim, quod voluntas non imperat sibi ipsi secundum idem, sed ipsa, ut vult finem, movet seipsam per imperium ad volendum media: non potest autem velle media nisi proponendo illa sibi; et ita habet locum, ut mediante ordinatione et propositione intellectus, moveat in seipsam, sicut expresse dicit S. Thomas I-2, quaest. XVII, art. V. Non enim motio imperii deferri debet solum ad alterum suppositum, quod extra nos est, sed etiam ad ipsam voluntatem, ut ex volitione unius moveatur per imperium ad volitionem alterius. Reliquas autem potentias solum movet voluntas per imperium, quantum ad exercitium motus; exercitium autem non subditur imperio, nisi quatenus voluntarium est. In

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his enim, quae voluntarie fiunt, usus, seu exercitium distinguitur ab actu: et ideo imperari potest a voluntate, quantum ad exercitium, et non quantum ad speciem actus, ut notavit optime Cajetanus I-2, quaest. IX, articulo primo; actus autem non potest recipere rationem voluntarii, nisi ut ordinatus ad finem voluntatis. Quare neque imperare, et movere potest eos voluntas, nisi per ordinarionem ad finem deferatur ad eos ratio voluntarii, et imperii. Et sic omnes actus imperati indigent actu intellectus deferente, et manifestante ordinationem, ut secundum voluntatem fiant; et si sunt actus sensibiles, ut imperentur, indigent manifestatione sensibili, qua moveatur appetitus, et membra ei subjecta. Et sic omnes virtutes existentes in voluntate, si imperant aliis, semper media ordinatione imperant.

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